Alien traditions, it is replied, may have answers where Western intellectuals
have problems - but these answers cannot be taken seriously. Science,
technology, medicine and other institutions that have been developed in the
West are better than all alternatives, because they have results. This is why
their problems are real problems which must be taken seriously by everybody.
This reply, which many philosophers accept without hesitation, has
no rational basis. The sciences, it is said, are uniformly better than all
alternatives - but where is the evidence to support this claim? Where, for
example, are the control groups which show the uniform (and not only the
occasional) superiority of Western scientific medicine over the medicine of
the Nei ehing? Or over Hopi medicine? Such control groups need patients
that have been treated in the Hopi manner, or in the Chinese manner using
Hopi experts and experts in traditional Chinese medicine (rather than
Western physicians who have learned the one or the other exotic trick and
now already regard themselves as 'experts' in the alien art), but the
requested procedures are often against the law and are at any rate frowned
upon and sabotaged by the medical societies. Secondly, the reply assumes
what is to be shown, viz. standards that make the results of science
worthwhile. But a mystic who can leave his material body and meet God
Himself will hardly be impressed by the fact that thousands of people, using
billions of dollars of tax money, succeeded in putting two wrapped-up
bodies on a hot and dried-out stone, the moon, and he will deplore the
decrease and almost complete destruction of man's spiritual abilities that is
a result of the materialistic-scientific climate of our times. One may of
course ridicule such an observation - but one cannot remove it by using the

argument from scientific success. Difference in standards and values plays
an even greater role in medicine: Western 'scientific' medicine aims at the
smooth functioning of the body-machine no matter what its feelings or its
aesthetic appearance; other forms of medicine are interested in feelings,
intuitive abilities, special achievements<,> prophecy, Shamanism, that
cannot be measured in materialistic terms.
Another objection to a democratic relativism is that we live in a scientific
age and have to adapt to it. The reply is, first, that this is not true - science
is by no means omnipresent - and, secondly, that even its omnipresence
cannot be regarded as an argument for acceptance: if a country is invaded
by locusts then it is useful to study their habits, but it would be quite
unreasonable to turn them into national deities.
The elitism attacked, so goes a further argument, does no harm, for
today everybody can in principle become a member of the elite: everybody
can become a scientist, a politician, a Great Thinker, even the President of
a University. However, one can become a member of the elite only if one
adopts its ideology and its habits: equality, including equality of women and
'racial' equality, does not mean equality of traditions; it means equality if
access to one particular tradition - the tradition of the White Man. White
Liberals supporting the demand for equality have opened the promised
land - but it is a promised land built according to their own specifications,
filled with their own favourite playthings and accessible only in accordance
with their particular requirements (cf. the importance of 'intelligence' tests
for access to all sorts of activities). 15
The most effective move against a democratic relativism - for we can
hardly speak of an argument - is emotional blackmail or, more correctly,
slander. For example, many critics raise the spectre of racism, Auschwitz,
terrorism, chaos. But democratic relativism denies the right of traditions to
impose their form of life on others, and it therefore recommends the
protection of traditions from interference from outside. Hopi medicine will
be protected from Western medico-fascism just as Jews will be protected
from the political fascism of the Anti-Semites. Nor is the fear of chaos
justified: the traditions whose independence we want to protect are usually
much stricter towards their members than is the protecting mechanism
towards the protected traditions. The belief that the institutions of a free
society should protect the individual and not traditions, is closely connected
with the liberal belief that individuals can exist and have properties worth
protecting independently of all traditions. The belief is correct to a certain
extent: a foetus already has individuality, it reacts towards its surroundings,

it contains the possibilities for a rich and rewarding life. What is not correct
is the assumption that preservation of these possibilities is a basic value
never to be overruled. Not even liberals make this assumption a basis of
their creed (not all liberals are pacifists). Besides, a foetus is not a fully
fledged human being; it needs a tradition to become that, and so traditions
do become the prime elements of society. Of course there will be cases
when the state rightfully interferes even with the internal business of the
traditions it contains (to prevent the spreading of infectious diseases, for
example), for as with every rule the rules of democratic relativism have
exceptions. The point is that in a democracy the nature and the placement
of the exceptions is determined by specially elected groups of citizens and
not by experts, and that these groups will choose a democratic relativism as
the basis on which the exceptions are imposed. The problem of education,
however (people may remain in execrable traditions because they do not
know better, hence we need a uniform and universal education) provides
an argument against the status quo, not for it: hardly any adherent of science,
of scientific medicine, of rational procedures has chosen this form of life
from among a variety of alternatives, the scientific point of view was
imposed by 'education', not chosen16 and the groups who want to leave the
fold and return to more traditional forms of life do so in full knowledge of
the splendours they are leaving behind: they have savoured the bouquet of
scientific rationalism and have found it wanting. We see that neither
arguments nor moral pressures can remove the democratic relativism that
was proposed at the beginning of the present section. And there are many
arguments in itsfavour. 17
The first argument, which I have already mentioned, is one of rights.
People have the right to live as they see fit. If there exists a tradition that has
religious reasons for rejecting certain forms of medical treatment (some
tribes in Central Africa do not want to be X-rayed because they do not
want their internal organs exposed to view), then no institution should be
permitted to force it to accept these forms. Conversely, if there is a tradition
that uses treatment contrary to the ideas of Western medicine, then no
institution should be permitted to force it to reject these forms, or to put
them at a disadvantage (no health insurance, for example, or no paid sick
leave). Science or rationalism, in this view, are instruments put at the
disposal of the people to be used by them as they see fit; they are not necessary

conditions of rationality, or citizenship, or life. Scientists are salesmen of
ideas and gadgets, they are not judges of Truth and Falsehood. Nor are
they High Priests of Right Living. I have already said that there are
exceptions to this rule, as there are to any rule. The point is that in a
democracy these exceptions are dealt with by democratic councils, and that
these councils take democratic relativism as their starting-point.
A second argument in favour of a democratic relativism is closely
connected with Mill's arguments for proliferation. A society that contains
many traditions side by side has much better means ofjudging each single
tradition than a monistic society. It enhances both the quality of the
traditions, and the maturity of its citizens. We can learn a lot from
'primitive' tribes about care for the aged, treatment of 'criminal' elements,
treatment of (behavioural) aberrations. We can observe the advantages of
direct knowledge over an 'objective' account that approaches its object in a
standardized and severely alienating way. For Montaigne and his followers
in the Enlightenment a study of savage cultures provided not only valuable
contributions to the understanding of man, it also put a mirror in front of
'civilized' man and exposed his shortcomings and vices. Today a look at the
lives of independent women can show us the barbarism that characterizes so
much of our man-made societies. Democratic relativism makes these
contrasts stand out and so enables everybody to learn from them in her or
his own way.
A third argument follows directly from the second. Scientific views are
not only incomplete, in that they omit important phenomena, they are
often erroneous at the very centre of their competence. Routine arguments
and routine procedures are based on assumptions which are inaccessible to
the research of the time and often turn out to be either false or nonsensical.
Examples are the views on space, time, and reality in eighteenth- and
nineteenth-century physics and astronomy, the materialism of most medical
researchers today, the crude empiricism that guided much of seventeenthand
eighteenth-century science and influenced even the debates about the
Darwinian theory. These views are essential parts of important research
traditions, and yet only few practitioners know them and can talk about
them intelligently. And yet scientists show increased belligerence when the
views are attacked, and they throw their whole authority behind ideas they
can neither formulate nor defend: who does not remember how vigorously
some scientists have defended a rather naIve form of empiricism without
even being able to say what facts are or why anyone should take them
seriously. The lesson to be learned from this phenomenon is thatjundamental
debates between traditions are debates between laymen which can and should be settled
by no higher authority than again the authority iflaymen, i.e. democratic councils.
The situation just described is important in cases where the belief in the
soundness of a view or enterprise has led to institutional (and not only

intellectual) measures against alternatives. 'Scientific' medicine is a good
example. It is not a monolithic entity, it contains many departments,
schools, ideas, procedures and a good deal of dissension. However, there
are some widespread assumptions which influence research at many points
but are never subjected to criticism. One is the assumption that illnesses
are due to material disturbances which can be localized and identified as to
their chemico-physiological nature, and that the proper treatment consists
in removing them either by drugs or by surgery (including complex
methods of surgery such as laser surgery). The question is whether the
problems of scientific medicine - and there are many - have something to
do with this assumption, or whether their origin lies elsewhere. Everybody
knows that death rates in hospitals go down when doctors go on strike. Is
this due to the incompetence of the physicians, or does it show a basic fault
in the theoretical structure that guides their actions? Everybody knows that
cancer research absorbs huge amounts of money and has few results. 18 Is
this due to the fact that cancer researchers are mainly interested in theory,
not in healing, or does it indicate a basic fault of the theories used? We do
not know. To find out we must first make the basic assumptions (materialism,
for example) visible, and then examine them in a more direct
manner. To examine them in a more direct manner we have to compare
the results of scientific medicine with those of forms of medicine based on
entirely different principles. Democratic relativism permits and protects the
practice of such different forms of medicine. 19 It makes the needed
comparisons possible. Democratic relativism, therefore, not only supports a right,
it is also a most usiful research instrumentfor any tradition that accepts it.

二十年，这也是我用来看清这个假命题所用的时间。

集权主义被推倒，共识型自由资本主义民主全面取胜，这是我们当时的结论。我们当时恨中国的未能赶上这一世界历史的新节律，很是懊恼。

现在看去，中国走了资本主义下三路，与美国这个泼皮打交道没三日，就将穿裆功夫学到。根本不是本书呆子原来一厢情愿以为的理论到选票也到，而是横店式经营的功夫片资本主义：国家权力是那钢丝，你以为是自由选择和价格机制，背后却只有国家权力这个妈妈桑。粗暴的强拆迁式的资本主义我们中国人是给自己弄上了。文革中六万万政治主体的解放，变成现成的九万万幽灵财奴，这中间也是二十年多一点儿的时间。

中国不需要推倒那堵墙，就直奔那顽意儿去了。《建国大业》比任何好莱坞大片都更赤裸裸呈示了国家权力与资本主义货币教之间的关系。你今天才看明白，这个发行系统不需要广告，因为中共的全部意识形态宣传，就是从头至尾的广告，从头到尾是广告，连节目也是广告（这就是百分百资本主义）。激进艺术家、反叛诗人、大学理论家都曾认为，中国共的左极权与那个柏林墙以西的顽意儿是对立的，我们大学知识分子都曾带着廉价而油滑的人道主义，象资产阶级主妇那样，期待那种优雅的新资本主义秩序的到来，让我们大学里有思想和理论，让街上有花朵和亲吻，让一切从此都要美好的幸福彩票能兑现，这些正是那堵墙倒时的图片的核心意象。那，你看，全是我们读书人的意淫！

那堵墙是留给我们书呆子抒情用的，是用来招徕游客用的。它造成了多少艺术品的涨价，浪费了多少的马铃薯张和油墨！

人类只有一种冲动，它只是资本主义的。资本主义不是中国读书人傻呆呆以为是要争取来的，推倒墙才到来的，它是活跃于我们的每一脉搏里的。与它斗争，是像透析肺一样痛苦的手术。东西德人民心里现在都有一本账了，能告诉我们什么叫做后极权主义了。这是他共同的枷锁。

墙倒后，我们掉落到一种后极权主义时代。我们的更大的痛苦在于，我们连墙这一借口也被剥夺了。我们永远被束缚于一种半破坏半亵渎的消费行为中了。除了自恋和旧，我们还能做什么呢？

It is a future which demands the constitution of an antiquity appropriate to it. Yet is this ‘ideological antiquity’ not simply another way of saying that Marx, and with him Marxism, is outmoded? The comic sequences of Kluge’s film, the young couple at various moments in history tormenting each other with a koranic recital of Marx’s abstractions, might lead us to think so. Nor is Eisenstein non-outmoded either, with his baggage of old-fashioned melodrama, old-fashioned silent film, old-fashioned montage. Lenin and intertitles! Itself a seemingly dreary prospect for a digital postmodernity . . .

Yet one dimly remembers Marx’s own feelings for antiquity: Prometheus and Aristotle’s theory of value, Epicurus and Hegel’s thoughts on Homer. And then there is the question with which the great 1857 draft introduction to the Grundrisse breaks off: ‘the difficulty lies not in understanding that Greek art and epic poetry are bound up with certain forms of social development. The difficulty is that they still give us aesthetic pleasure and are in certain respects regarded as a standard and unattainable model.’ [17] Marx was anything but nostalgic, and he understood that the polis was a limited and thereby contradictory social formation to which one could scarcely return; and also that any future socialism would be far more complex than capitalism itself, as Raymond Williams once observed.

For the concept of antiquity may have the function of placing us in some new relationship with the Marxian tradition and with Marx himself—as well as Eisenstein. Marx is neither actual nor outmoded: he is classical, and the whole Marxist and Communist tradition, more or less equal in duration to Athens’s golden age, is precisely that golden age of the European left, to be returned to again and again with the most bewildering and fanatical, productive and contradictory results. [18] And if it is objected that it would be an abomination to glamorize an era that included Stalinist executions and the starvation of millions of peasants, a reminder of the bloodiness of Greek history might also be in order—the eternal shame of Megara, let alone the no less abominable miseries of slave society as such. Greece was Sparta as much as Athens, Sicily as much as Marathon; and the Soviet Union was also the deathknell of Nazism and the first sputnik, the People’s Republic of China the awakening of countless millions of new historical subjects. The category of classical antiquity may not be the least productive framework in which a global left reinvents an energizing past for itself.

studium是我们一般的和文化、文明上的兴趣。摄影师想要讨好我们的studium，讨好我们的口味，不论是哪种，不论我们说得清还是说不清。所有的关于事实和现实的摄影，都是有一种studium方面的意义。

但具体的一个感动我的摄影，比摄影本身具有的一般旨趣更生动的那一部分，那一谜一般抓住我、捕获我、唤醒我、吃惊我的细节，这一因素就是punctum，因为这是一个点、刺和辣的空间，它是来感动我的（V，930）。

所有现代科学只有心理分析是不拿人的年龄说事儿的。对于它，人是没有年龄的：只有性的年龄，而这性是不会进化的，它总会慢慢地回返，总在，直到死去的好运一记得，因为人总是是时时在转变的，总在爱，从第一口呼吸到最后一口呼吸。

每一个社会都要分出人类主体的年龄。它创造出年龄、阶级。它总要创造出一种象征，来安排人的年龄。在今天，是科学在做这件分出年龄的事儿。社会学、医学、心理学、人口学、犯罪孽深重学，甚至政治本身，都在分出更细的年龄层。古代社会、军事社会和现在的竞争社会，都要分清和编码各年龄层的流动（V， 481-483）。

我一感到我不会去有了，那我就老了；自由了，那就是我重新发现了我的年龄。会爱的主体是没有年龄的（482）。

语言使得基督教忏悔的明确性显得纯真。这与邪教的无语形成对比。祈祷必须用语言说出来。语言使基督教从偶像崇拜走到了一种大宗教：有它自己的特定的语义，来战胜它的自我解释中的暧昧和空洞。宗教必须从图像走到语言。语言的图像化，才是它的宣教。

语言对宗教的保证作用首先是实在论式的：用语言形式来担保它有实有其事儿，使人们误以为宗教里说的事儿，就是他们平时用语言在说的事儿。

第二个作用是逻辑上的。语言将宗教图式讲得像是用标点隔开一样的，有了启承转合，有渐进过渡，神性只是一串列表，上帝是一个个可以举出来的特征的集合了。

伦理上的作用：语言的能量只是一种形式，它是要带人冲到世界之外，它只是被利用来为更大目标服务的（III，758-759）。

The diffuse intellectuality I am talking about and the
Marxian notion of a "general intellect"lO acquire their
meaning only within the perspective of this experience.
They name the multitudo that inheres to the power of
thought as such（隐含于、内在于我们的思想中的诸众）. Intellectuality and thought are not a
form of life among others in which life and social production
articulate themselves, but they are rather the
unitary power that constitutes the multiple forms of life as
form-oflife. In the face of state sovereignty, which can
affirm itself only by separating in every context naked
life from its form, they are the power that incessantly
reunites life to its form or prevents it from being dissociated
from its form. The act of distinguishing between
the mere, massive inscription of social knowledge into
the productive processes (an inscription that characterizes
the contemporary phase of capitalism, the society
of the spectacle) and intellectuality as antagonistic power
and form-of-life such an act passes through the experience
of this cohesion and this inseparability. Thought
is form-of-life, life that cannot be segregated from its

form思想是生活的形式，是那不能被隔离到其形式中的生活; and anywhere the intimacy of this inseparable life
appears, in the materiality of corporeal processes and of
habitual ways of life no less than in theory, there and only
there is there thought（只有这一无法我们分离的生命出现，在好运一身体过程的物质性中，生命和理论中的习惯过程中，才有思想，也只有其中才会有思想）. And it is this thought, this formof-
life, that, abandoning naked life to "Man" and to the
"Citizen," who clothe it temporarily and represent it with
their "rights," must become the guiding concept and the
unitary center of the coming politics（这样的思想才应该成为未来的政治的凝合中心）（阿甘本《没有目的的手段》，8。9）.
(1993)

正如其它的神话传统想要激活原初的神秘时间，去与神同时代，达到创造的原初层面，在艺术中，作品的线性时间被打断，人在过去和未之间复其在场的时间。去观看一个艺术品，这意味着冲进一个更原初的时间，意味着韵律的载天辟地的开放中的一种狂喜）it means （在对艺术品的体验中，人站到了真理中，站到了在诗性的行动上中揭示给他的源泉头中）.

艺术在今天已失去其原衩结构。在其形而上命运的尽头处，我们看到，艺术已成为一种虚无的力量，只是一种自我消失的无了，正彷徨在审美领域的沙漠中。它的异化是根本异化，是人的原衩历史空间的异化。艺术的异化，表明人已发挥作用去了他的使他成为人、能在其中行动上和认知的那一世界空间。

人一旦失去其诗性地位，他无法在别的事上重建其尺度。大难处会不会有大拯救，艺术会不会将人在地球上的尺度当尺度？

By
opening to man his authentic temporal dimension, the work of art also opens
for him the space of his belonging to the world, only within which he can take
the original measure of his dwelling on earth and find again his present truth
in the unstoppable flow of linear time.
In this authentic temporal dimension, the poetic status of man on earth finds
its proper meaning. Man has on earth a poetic status, because it is poiesis
that founds for him the original space of his world. Only because in the poetic
ἐποχή he experiences his being-in-the-world as his essential condition does a
world open up for his action and his existence. Only because he is capable of
the most uncanny power, the power of pro-duction into presence, is he also
capable of praxis, of willed and free activity. Only because he attains, in the
poetic act, a more original temporal dimension is he a historical being, for
whom, that is, at every instant his past and future are at stake.
Thus the gift of art is the most original gift, because it is the gift of the original
site of man（阿甘本《无内容的人》，62-64）.

我们只能以考古学的形式进入当代，也就是将考古学用到我们当代中的那些我们绝对无法活出的部分上。用到我们身上的那没有被活出的部分。我们活过了，但有很多部分并没有被活出，将被不停地吸回到我们的根源中。那一没有被活出的部分，虽然已到过我们身上，却是我们永远无法触及的。所谓当代和当前，就是我们活过的所有东西里的那一没有被活出的部分。

那阻挡我们不能进入当前的东西，正是那我们不知出于什么原因（可能是因为创伤可能是因为太近）而无法去活出的东西。关注这一未被活出的东西，正是当代人的生活本身（做好一个当代人，使自己去成为当代，就是要去关注这一我们身上的未被活出的部分）。在这一意义上说，去成为当代、做好一个当代人，就是去回看那一我们从未到过的当前（阿甘本，《什么是装置》，51-52）。

巴尔特总结尼采的话：做当代人是不合时宜的；必须与这个时代不相关，才能真正做好当代人。诗人曼德斯太姆说，这个时代是断了背骨的，我们是在这个断裂处来把握这个时代的，时代是out-of-joint了，我们的到来，就是来粘结这种断裂的。我们被当代的强烈刺光灼伤，在时代的刺眼中看到了黑暗，这才使我们成为当代。我们因为看到自己身上还有未被活出的部分，不是去与每一个人成为当代人，所以，我们才感到我们与根源相连。我们是在当前的每一处上都与过去的每一个时代相联系这一意义上去成为当代的人。我们在阅读和写作中发现过往和所有文本里的符号和形象都是鲜活地“当前”着的，我们这才感到我们自己是当代人。做模特儿式的总是穿着最新款的东西的当代人，是不可取也不可能的，他们总只是已经和不再，我们必须让自己成为当下、正在和落入。

阿甘本的这一论术里有太多的东西可以被归纳出来。这些话仿佛是给了我思考当代的勇气：不是因为执着当前的权杖而来了底气，而是被我身上的还被活出那些东西支撑。是的，我还是剩下了一些可用来支持我自己的东西的，在一切都过了之后。不要革命、不要弥撒亚，我要让一切在我的当前里到场，每一个口袋都被翻出，但我只是因为那正退我而去正重新进入黑暗中的东西而感到有力量。去成为当代人，就像是一种献出：用我自己的当前去焊接各种当代的破碎。

一切都是当代的了。一切都到当代来报了到。但到处都是幽灵/幻影。在活着的当前的核心，在我们的哲学生活用品的最鲜活的脉动中，只有那幽灵/幻影。

我们只是那个被电视转播的幽灵/幻影而已。我们可以被生产，可以被转播，奇迹般到场。

当前，哪个当前，许多个当前同时到场。在另一个大陆的幽暗的房间里，在此记得，当下，我相信了这个所说的幽灵。我们如何来相信各种活着的当前的共时性？

到处都有幽灵，有看不见的可见性，用不着我回看的那种朝我看来。一种绝对的自治从来不可能。幽灵摆弄着那一绝对地看的权利。那是一种我看不到的但对我起作用的法则。由于这幽灵，我是处在一种他治里的。我的自由是被限在这一来自他者的凝视、在他者凝视下的所生的责任中的。

他者的凝视，这是一个世界中的另一个世界的根源的不可还原的他性，是另一个现象性的来源，另一种出现之原点。

这种以电视为代表的那种“涌出一股光来摄住我、投资到我身上的”幽灵显现，这种关于真物、只是真物的效应，l‘effec de reel，彻底替代了或架空了人的生存中的“触摸的不可替代性”。我们的体验因此是中空的。“这”对我们不存在。

这就到了海德格尔那里去了：现象学下的海德格尔要考察关于活着的当前的有效性之形而上学。他想要排除幽灵，来获得关于科学、哲学、政治和技术的尊严，也就是获得思想的尊严。他假设，技术与哲学、技术与形而上学、技术与西方有某种内在关系，认为技术是第二性的，是可以被收回到、汲收到那个前技术的根源或physis中的。这就是当代生态主义者接受的所谓海德格尔反技术情愫（pathos）：反技术的也就是本源泉论的也就是生态主义式的（德里达/斯蒂格勒，《回声学》，127-149）。

不走海德格尔套路，我们就得走德里达在《马克思的各种幽灵》中向我们指出 的那条路：路在前方，在和路的那一不可能中；幽灵是那个哈姆莱特父亲，他来指认、来指引，但不来参与；它将责任和他治带到我们身上。向未来学习，这是我们不得不得出的政治教训。一切都变成当代的了，幽灵乱舞，就是这个意思。

继承是从一种独特性传到另一种独特性的。继承是要从另外一种独特性出发来教我们一种属于我们自己的独特性。那个我们所要者，回头凝视着我们。

技术威胁着遗产，但没有技术，我们就得不到遗产。所以，遗产和继承总是那么地成问题的两件事儿。继承，这是要忠于一种对象，引入一种责任。面对过去，我们需一种大技术，需要一种不排除了人的动物性的那种技术，那种不再将人的某些部分关进动物园的技术（德里达/斯蒂格勒《回声学》，99-100）。

在倒错的世界里，真理只是虚假的划过我们眼前的一个瞬间。

如果当代艺术无法顶天立地地去存在，那么，我们也难于去评断古典艺术。我们不光难于和不能，而且，由于无知和怯懦，我们还敢对它动手动脚。无知就是为了被利用，才被生产出来。

由于我们对于艺术的历史感、我们的口味没能在激烈的当代艺术实践中被考验和锤炼，我们只是照着我们自己的文化象征逻辑，用一些流行的主题串在组织一些虚假的作品网络。艺术家也只是盯着博物馆和收藏者，只求作品能进他们的手中，正如国际货币基金能将各国的债务转正为资产。大量假的（并不一定指赝品）东西渗出入艺术的国际铭写，堂皇地作为当代艺术正典压到我们自己头上。

这个景观社会所造成的虚假的口味形式也使我们无法去参照真正的艺术口味。美国人最富，所以做假、收假、卖假也最多。他们其实是不要真的米凯朗琪罗的壁画的，因为那不够光亮，也没有镀过金。费尔巴哈总结道：他那时代不要物，只要图像；不要原作，只要拷贝；不要现实，只要REPRESENTATION。我们时代有过之而无不及。假物有理由存在，但它是来替代真的，这是可怕的。只要游客相机里能被拍得更美，假的就比真的更好，生锈的城市内的铜像会让游客生气的。

德波尔认为，这方面最令人吃惊的例子，是中国官方将仿造的秦始皇兵马俑放到原坑内，被当作真物来展览，给各国的政治元首们来惊叹。原物不好看，比例不对；来看的人不是来细评后得出结论，是准备了许多工作当量的情绪和形容词来惊叹的，你画个符号在好运里，他们也要惊叹的。是的，连统治者想要被当选，也要取经于广告商来学着控制那个公共政治话语-行动场了，那也只是在合适的镜头里微笑和握手罢了。

近期老走过绍兴城中心的很挡着高档车炫富的路那个秋瑾烈士纪念碑。老实说，从五十米开外望去，它不光在高楼下显得失去比例，而且它看上去蛮脏的，对这个有四百亿乡村工业产值的县城而言，像个污点；对于它今天的无顾忌的资本主义扩张和毁坏，的确是。

现在，连我这个有点近代史知识的人也问自己：这女士当时到底要献身个啥？你知道我们村里也经常是有农妇想不开而吃农药自杀的，远望，你也想不通她们为什么这么想不通。秋MM是想通的。但她想通的是我们的想不通的。我们没有像她那样想通是不幸，我们都象她那样想通，可能也是不幸的。让我等会儿再接着展开这个话题。

话说她的纪念碑边上是围着十三家肯德基（这是三年前的数据了，是我和我不肖的外甥当时用人类学式方法也就是说用脚和眼睛考证出来的），后者的胡罗卜面包很容易让人联想到那著名的人血馒头。我们老小两个当时就发问：为什么这鲁迅笔下的曾经的看客社会现在是这么与肯德基干上了？现在有答案了：他们需要资本主义红旗渠来开通欲望，用资本主义式油炸和冰镇和烘焙来实现自己的主体自治和个性解放。那个鲁姓文学青年根本不省世事，甚至拎不清：你到底是要让看客们革命、有思想还是做殉道者？你根本不管人家的小日子。砍秋女士头的那一天，看客们其实是不识时务地来参加时装发布会或脱衣舞表演的！多么地不合时宜，被鲁愤青看见，自然是活该挨骂了。现在，坐进肯德鸡，看客们终于身在异乡胜故乡了：看客们只在看人家在这里我也在这里就行了，正如那人血馒头其实也不是因为挨饿才吃的一样。肯德基才是那终极景观，吃，看，看，吃。至于人血馒头，它是围着秋女士纪念碑的沾着矿工和民工的血的奥迪和宝马了，谁见了它们愤怒过了？

好的，来说关于那个想通的事儿。外族君主独裁哪怕对于没双重身份和国外存款的人来说，也不是什么大事儿了。反国外列强和跨国资本，在政治上如今会被认为是反对改革开放了，总之是，秋女士如果要让中国过了清王朝后搞资本主义，是不必这么大闹的，正如几千万她身后的革命英烈献身的那一共产主义事业，到头来也是政客和红鼠们大捞的一个由头，与两代人的理想与激情毫无关系。

其实，这样评说秋女士那代的想通和想不通，是残酷的。只是，我们要小心今天的那些仍在拿这些前人的想通想不通做文章的人。

近代史之后的历史，对我们中国人是一团混账，评说对不对，有没有想通，都是毫无意义。当前的城市里的水泥书写，才是胜过一切的硬道理。不满这种水泥书写？你就落进我的困境里了：只能用理论这种恐怖主义武器去对付这个就是我们人类为了自己的舒适而豢养出来的那个让我们的皮肤毛孔发热来为我们增利的资本主义大装置。这事说难很难，说简单，阿甘本说，就是像儿童使用大炮来当玩具一样，用它，让它本身进入后人的经济循环就可以。