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Alexander Sotirov逆出来的MS08-067问题函数伪代码
2008-10-25 8:28
这个Biu漏洞分配给了小四。小四说,不必着急,一定会有人指着这个扬名立万,可以稍微等等。果不其然,吃完午饭上来,就有人放PoC出来了。

昨天晚上,“Father of China PT”又问我想不想写ms08-067的代码。我说这么赶着写这个干嘛呀,咱们也不急着下大雨。“Father of China PT”说:这个漏洞大家都在盯着,写了就流芳百世了。我说:关键是想流芳百世的人那么多,咱们又不急用,等两天,各种代码肯定会乌泱乌泱铺天盖地而来,就跟当年ms03-026一样,咱们可以捡个现成。

结果今天早晨发现Alexander Sotirov连逆的代码贴出来了。这段代码很有教学意义,我打算收到我的案例库里去。

顺便说一句,这个Alexander Sotirov下个月会来XCon演讲“Bypassing browser memory protections in Windows Vista”。

From http://www.phreedom.org/blog/2008/decompiling-ms08-067/

Decompiling the vulnerable function for MS08-067

Oct 24, 2008

I spent a couple of hours tonight reversing the vulnerable code responsible for the MS08-067 vulnerability. This bug is pretty interesting, because it is in the same area of code as the MS06-040 buffer overflow, but it was completely missed by all security researchers and Microsoft. It's quite embarassing.

Here's the code of the vulnerable function on Windows XP SP3:

#include <wchar.h>

// This is the decompiled function sub_5B86A51B in netapi32.dll on XP SP3

int ms08_067(wchar_t* path)
{
wchar_t* p;
wchar_t* q;
wchar_t* previous_slash = NULL;
wchar_t* current_slash = NULL;
wchar_t ch;

// If the path starts with a server name, skip it

if ((path[0] == L'\\' || path[0] == L'/') &&
(path[1] == L'\\' || path[1] == L'/'))
{
p = path+2;

while (*p != L'\\' || *p != L'/') {
if (*p == L'\0')
return 0;
p++;
}

p++;

// make path point after the server name

path = p;

// make sure the server name is followed by a single slash

if (path[0] == L'\\' || path[0] == L'/')
return 0;
}

if (path[0] == L'\0') // return if the path is empty
return 1;

// Iterate through the path and canonicalize ..\ and .\

p = path;

while (1) {
if (*p == L'\\') {
// we have a slash

if (current_slash == p-1) // don't allow consequtive slashes
return 0;

// store the locations of the current and previous slashes

previous_slash = current_slash;
current_slash = p;
}
else if (*p == L'.' && (current_slash == p-1 || p == path)) {
// we have \. or ^.

if (p[1] == L'.' && (p[2] == L'\\' || p[2] == L'\0')) {
// we have a \..\, \..$, ^..\ or ^..$ sequence

if (previous_slash == NULL)
return 0;

// example: aaa\bbb\..\ccc
// ^ ^ ^
// | | &p[2]
// | |
// | current_slash
// |
// previous_slash

ch = p[2];

wcscpy(previous_slash, &p[2]);

if (ch == L'\0')
return 1;

current_slash = previous_slash;
p = previous_slash;

// find the slash before p

// BUG: if previous_slash points to the beginning of the
// string, we'll go beyond the start of the buffer
//
// example string: \a\..\

q = p-1;

while (*q != L'\\' && q != path)
q--;

if (*p == L'\\')
previous_slash = q;
else
previous_slash = NULL;
}
else if (p[1] == L'\\') {
// we have \.\ or ^.\

if (current_slash != NULL) {
wcscpy(current_slash, &p[1]);
goto end_of_loop;
}
else { // current_slash == NULL
wcscpy(p, p+2);
goto end_of_loop;
}
}
else if (p[1] != L'\0') {
// we have \. or ^. followed by some other char

if (current_slash != NULL) {
p = current_slash;
}
*p = L'\0';
return 1;
}
}

p++;

end_of_loop:
if (*p == L'\0')
return 1;
}
}

// Run this program to simulate the MS08-067 vulnerability

int main()
{
return ms08_067(L"\\a\\..\\");
}

 
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