NOTHING highlights the scale of banking’s upheaval better than the intervention of governments. An industry that embodied the free market turns out to be pathetically dependent on the state for its survival. In some cases, the civil servants are officially in charge. The taxpayer is already the majority owner of Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) and Lloyds Banking Group in Britain. The German government is poised to take control of Hypo Real Estate. American taxpayers are set to own the largest single stake in Citigroup. In many more cases, officials exercise control without formal representation, imposing pay limits and lending targets. The government is the industry’s largest shareholder and the guarantor of its liabilities.

没有什么能比得上政府介入更能昭示近期银行业发生的巨变了。一个以自由市场著称的行产业如今竟到了不得不地依赖政府求生的可怜境地。已有银行被政府正式接管了。纳税人已经成为英国的苏格兰皇家银行（RBS）和劳埃德银行集团的主要所有人。德国政府正准备接手抵押房地产公司（Hypo Real Estate？）。美国的纳税人即将获得花旗集团的最大个股（？）。在更多的案例中，政府在没有被正式授权的情况下就行使管理着的角色，强行设置付款限额和放贷目标。政府是这个行业的最大股东和其自身债务的保证人。

Yet the magnitude of this shift can easily be overstated. Governments routinely step in to rescue banks at times of systemic distress, observes Claudio Borio of the Bank for International Settlements. Rating agencies have long assessed banks’ creditworthiness in part on the likelihood of government support should they get into trouble. Their judgment, as everyone knows, is not always right. Moody’s was pilloried in early 2007 for awarding gold-plated AAA ratings to the big Icelandic banks on the false premise that the authorities in Reykjavik could afford to rescue them. But the assumption that governments will try to help a big bank in crisis is nothing new.

然而这一巨大转变极易被夸大而为。政府在银行系统出现危机时例行公事地介入进行援助，国际结算银行的克劳德博瑞尔评论道。评级机构很早就以银行在陷入困境时得到的政府支持的可能性大小对其进行评级。众所周知，他们的判断，并不总是正确的。穆迪公司曾在2007 初将冰岛的一些大型银行评定为三A级而备受嘲讽，其原因就在于穆迪错误地预计雷克雅未克（冰岛首都——译者注）将会对这些银行施以援手。

This contract to intervene was first legally recognised after the Depression, when the Glass-Steagall act of 1933 created the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). Since then, similar deposit-guarantee schemes have been created around the world to help persuade savers, who are otherwise unsecured creditors （个人认为此处不好作词组译，宜分开）of their bank, not to remove their money if it gets into trouble. Indeed, some advocates of free markets argue that this guarantee of compensation helped to cause the current crisis, by reducing the incentives for depositors to look closely at their banks.

这种政府介入的做法被首次合法化始于大萧条之后美国联邦存款保险公司（FDIC）于1933年颁布了《格拉斯——斯蒂格尔法案》。（完全打乱语序了）从那时起，类似的存款担保方案在世界其他地方出现来取得储蓄者的信任。让那些原本摇摆不定的债权人在银行陷入困境时不至于转移存款。事实上，一些自由市场的鼓吹者声称正是这些作为保证的补偿金促成了当今这场危机的出现，因为这样做减少了存款人监督银行的动因。

Whatever the merits of that argument, it is whistling in the wind to suggest that the state should withdraw from its commitment to support banks in times of trouble. “The body cannot survive without blood,” says Bo Lundgren, one of the architects of Sweden’s vaunted bank-rescue package of the early 1990s, “and the economy cannot survive without banks.” But now that this commitment has been called on so dramatically, three questions arise. The first is how long the state will remain so explicitly involved in the industry（是指银行业么？下文中还有个industry）. The second is what immediate distortions that involvement creates. And the third is what additional charges governments will levy on the industry in future for providing banks with such a huge safety net today.

无论这场辩论中孰是孰非，应当引起注意的是政府应当从为银行失利买单中抽身。“机体是无法离开血液存活的，”Bo Lundgren,上世纪90年代在瑞典鼓吹银行救援计划的策划人之一说到，“同理经济也离不开银行业。”然而由于这一承诺被号召地如此声势浩大，产生了三个问题。首先是政府参与银行业事务的确切时间要持续多长时间？其次是这种干预会产生何种直接负面影响。最后是在未来政府要向社会征收多少赋税来为银行业提供一个如此庞大的安全网。

The answer to the first question will be measured in years. Take Sweden’s bank bail-out. It was more successful than anyone had expected but it still took four years for the liability guarantees to be lifted. Nordbanken, the seed of today’s Nordea, was fully nationalised in 1992 and partly refloated three years later but the Swedish state remains its largest shareholder.

对于第一个问题的答案将被斟酌数年。以瑞典银行业救市为例。尽管它的成功已经出乎所有人的预料，但也花费了四年时间才清理完所有的保证金负债。 Nordbanken，如今的Nordea的前身，在1992年被全部国有化，虽然于三年后部分地重出江湖但瑞典政府仍然是它最大的股东。

The Swedish policymakers’ task was also less daunting. The bad assets in their banks were more homogenous and easier to value than those currently clogging things up. The Swedes intervened at the end of a recession, so banks quickly benefited from the recovery. Governments today have had to step in earlier in the economic cycle, implying a longer period of engagement for two reasons.

与此同时瑞典政策制定者的责任艰巨。在瑞典，银行的不良资产与那些近期导致银行系统混乱的事情相比要相对同质（？）并易于估价。瑞典政府与危机后期介入，因而银行业很快从中得益并复苏。今天政府在经济周期的早期进行介入，预示着这场介入的周期要长久的多，原因有二。

First, while loan losses continue to raise doubts about banks’ solvency, the presence of governments will be necessary to reassure creditors and counterparties. In America the healthiest banks are increasingly vocal about their desire to repay money from the Troubled Asset Relief Programme (TARP). But many bankers also recognise that they should not be too hasty in their bid for freedom. We are not going to pay off TARP money until we are certain we don’t need it, says a bank boss.

首先，在贷款损失继续瓦解着银行的偿付能力时，政府有必要介入来稳定债权人及其它权益人的信心。在美国连运营极佳的银行要求由不良资产偿付委员会（TARP）（没查，对否？）偿还其负债的呼声也越来越高。但很多银行家同时注意到他们不应该急于从债务中抽身。直到确信不再需要它之后我们才会偿还TARP的借款，以为银行经理（boss？）说道。

Regulators may not allow relatively strong banks to buy out the government early in any case, for fear of a further lurch downward in the economy and of leaving straggling institutions vulnerable to attack from short-sellers. “The idea of TARP repayment is a nonsense,” steams a Wall Street executive. “It all has to be paid back at the same time.”

无论如何，决策者也许（与in any case 有些矛盾）不会允许实力较强的银行买断所有国债，以免未来出现突然的经济下滑以及致使步履艰难的公司在卖空者的打击下变得更加脆弱。“由TARP代偿债务的主意毫无用处，”以为华尔街高级主管放言，“想要在同一时间偿还所有债务是不可能的”

Finding a way out

寻找出路

Even if it is feasible to replace government equity fairly quickly, most believe that it will take far longer for governments to exit their debt guarantees. Banks have lots of bubble-era debt to refinance this year and next. The coming torrent of government borrowing may make it harder for banks to attract private funding. And the more government-backed bank debt is issued, the greater the risk of creating another refinancing problem when state guarantees expire.

即使尽快替代政府债券可行，大部分人认为政府将要花费更长的时间来清空他们的担保负债。在今年乃至下年银行业都有大量的泡沫时期产生的负债要清理。政府借款的洪流将会导致银行向私募基金筹款更加困难。而且政府支持的银行债券发行的越多，当国债期满时出现再融资问题的风险越大。

The second reason why governments need to stay engaged is to counter the banks’ usual instincts during slowdowns. The obvious thing for banks to do in a recession, let alone one in which trust in counterparties has been shattered and a credit bubble is deflating, is lend less (see chart 2). Governments are urging banks to lend more to prop up the economy, even though in the long term they will want them to be more cautious lenders.

政府需要介入的第二个原因就是来矫正银行业在经济下滑是对惯常反应。在经济衰退时银行最明显的做法就是减少借款，更不用说在信用危机和泡沫破灭之时。政府正在督促银行大量放贷来拉动经济，即便从长远来看它们更希望银行成为更谨慎的借款者。

The political imperative for governments to try to make a return on their investments complicates matters further. Banks will have to look relatively risk-proof before they can be passed back into private ownership at a profit. All of which suggests that governments have to negotiate a prolonged transition before they will exit all of their investments in banks or remove their liability guarantees.

政府试图评估（“汇报”貌似不通~）它们资产的政治上的紧迫性使问题更加复杂化了。银行将不得不为重获利润自主的私人所有权而寻找相关风险证明。（重大存疑句~）所有这一切都暗示着在政府从银行撤出所有投资或是清除它们的债务担保金之前要经历一段相当长的协商转型期。

The longer governments stay involved, the more they will distort competition. Normally, private firms moan about having to compete with state-backed rivals but in this case government backing is likely to change from a boon into a handicap. Bank bosses in America who welcomed the initial injection of TARP capital have become progressively less enthusiastic about it. Those who have stayed outside the government net, in terms of equity participation at least, are revelling in their independence. “There is some tactical advantage to government money but it is deeply politicised,” says the boss of a big bank which has not taken state cash.

政府介入的时间越久，就越有可能扰乱竞争环境。通常，私人公司因不得不与由政府支持的对手竞争而抱怨不已，但在这种情况下，政府的支援往往适得其反。之前曾欢迎TARP注资的美国的银行老板们现在变得对此日益失去兴趣。那些游离于政府网络之外的企业，至少在参股上受益于它们的独立性。“虽然使用政府资金会有一些战略优势但它太政治化了。”一位没有接受政府救援金的大型银行老板说道。

Compensation is the obvious example. The top 25 employees at banks that have taken TARP money face tight regulation of their incentive-based pay until the government has been paid back. Prior bonuses are also at risk from punitive tax proposals. That may be sustainable for a while, says another boss: “We can say for a year or two that ‘we value you, you’re a leader and if you stay with us we will make it up to you’.” But eventually competition from unfettered rivals will tell.

补偿金是个明显的例子。已经接受TARP注资的银行在完全偿还政府资金之前，其前25明高层雇员要面临严格的奖金管理条例。优先分红也在受到严格纳税建议的风险中。这种情况将会持续一段时间，另一位银行老板说，“可以这样说，在一两年内‘我们尊重你，你使我们的领导者，如果你为我们找想我们也不会让你失望 ’。”（你——政府，我们——受助银行？）但最终如何挣开脚镣的竞争对手将会说明。

Freedom to act on the international stage is particularly prized by institutions that have not taken government cash. Taxpayers have little interest in seeing their money used to finance activities in other countries: they want it used for lending at home. The dismantling of RBS’s global empire is the most conspicuous example of this type of financial nationalism, but pressure to lend domestically is universal.With many competitors gone, impaired or under the cosh of government masters, banks that have been able to keep operating normally in global markets are already grabbing new wholesale business. Capital-raising is easier for independent banks too because shareholders and politicians have different priorities. “Investing capital where government is involved on a continuing basis is difficult because of concerns over restrictions on marketing and compensation expenses,” says Gary Parr of Lazard, an investment bank.

国际舞台上的自由行动尤其收到那些尚未接受政府资金的机构的推崇。纳税人没有兴趣看到他们的金钱被用于其他国家的金融活动中：他们希望这些资金用于国内贷款。RBS的全球帝国的解体受就是这种金融爱国主义影响的最为明显的例子，但在国内放贷要面临方方面面的压力。随着众多竞争对手或离开，或受到政府的削弱、管制，那些能够国际市场上正常运营的银行现在已经开始把握新的大规模的商机。集资对于独立银行来说也要相对容易，因为股东和政治家考虑的重点不同。“ 在政府不断介入的领域进行投资是件困难的事，因为要考虑到销售和奖金分配上的诸多限制。”来自拉扎德投行的格雷 帕尔说道。

There are also disadvantages to having government-owned rivals. The obvious one is unfair competition. Northern Rock, a British bank which was nationalised in early 2008 and was originally told to shut its doors to new borrowers and shrink its book, abruptly changed course in February. It now aims to lend an extra ?5 billion ($7.6 billion) in mortgages in 2009, and up to an additional ?9 billion in 2010. If government-owned banks were to underprice risk for a long period of time in order to meet lending targets, everyone would feel under pressure to respond.

遇到由政府所有的竞争对手当然也有不利的一面。之中明显的一点就是存在不公平竞争。诺森洛克，一家于2008年初被国有化的英国银行最初曾被告知不得再对新借款人开放业务同时还要缩减其账面债务，却突然在二月份改弦更张。它现在的目标是在2009年增加50亿欧元（即76亿美元）的放贷额并于2010年在增加90亿欧元。如果国有银行为了达到借款目标而采取低价风险竞争策略的话，其结果如何尚不好回答

A special report on international banking

国际银行业专题报道

May 14th 2009

From The Economist print edition